Jamming Detection in Massive MIMO Systems by Akhlaghpasand, Hossein et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
10
21
8v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  3
0 N
ov
 20
17
1
Jamming Detection in Massive MIMO Systems
Hossein Akhlaghpasand, S. Mohammad Razavizadeh, Emil Björnson, and Tan Tai Do
Abstract—This paper considers the physical layer security of
a pilot-based massive multiple-input multiple-output (MaMIMO)
system in presence of a multi-antenna jammer. To improve security
of the network, we propose a new jamming detection method that
makes use of a generalized likelihood ratio test over some coherence
blocks. Our proposed method utilizes intentionally unused pilots in
the network. The performance of the proposed detector improves
by increasing the number of antennas at the base station, the
number of unused pilots and also by the number of the coherence
blocks that are utilized. Simulation results confirm our analyses
and show that in the MaMIMO regime, perfect detection (i.e.,
correct detection probability is one) is achievable even with a small
number of unused pilots.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO, physical layer security, jamming
detection, unused pilots.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MaMIMO) technol-
ogy provides improvements of the physical layer security against
passive eavesdropping [1]. To cause more harm, the eaves-
dropper can decide to actively attack the legitimate system.
The asymptotic secrecy rate for downlink MaMIMO systems
is derived in [2] in the presence of an active multi-antenna
eavesdropper. Furthermore, for detection of an active eavesdrop-
per in a single-input multiple-output system, the authors in [3]
propose a detection method based on random training. Detection
methods based on cooperation between the base station (BS)
and the legitimate user are also suggested in [4]. A jammer can
be viewed as an active eavesdropper, which transmits jamming
signals in both the pilot and data phases. In MaMIMO systems,
by jamming the pilot phase, pilot contamination is caused which
significantly decreases the spectral efficiency of the legitimate
users. In [5], the authors propose a jamming detection and
countermeasure scheme for MaMIMO systems based on random
matrix theory. The authors in [6] propose a linear combining
scheme that exploits unused pilots to improve the spectral
efficiency of the MaMIMO systems in presence of a single-
antenna jammer. In [7], a jamming power allocation scheme is
investigated for MaMIMO systems, where a smart jammer aims
to maximize its deterioration effect on the spectral efficiency of
the legitimate system.
In order to apply the known methods for combating jamming,
we first need to detect the presence of the jammer. In this letter,
we propose a new jamming detection method by exploiting
a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) in the MaMIMO
systems. Our proposed detector utilizes the key properties of
MaMIMO systems, i.e., many antennas at the BS and the use
of uplink pilot transmission, in order to detect the jamming with
high accuracy. To this end, the proposed method estimates the
power of the multi-antenna jammer in some intentionally unused
pilot sequences (i.e., the pilots that are not assigned to any active
users, except during peak hours) over multiple coherence blocks.
To evaluate performance of the proposed method, we derive
closed-form expressions for the false alarm and correct detection
probabilities. Our analysis shows that the jamming detection
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improves by increasing the number of antennas at the BS as
well as the number of unused pilots. Simulation results show
that in systems with a large number of BS antennas, perfect
detection (i.e., correct detection probability is one) is achievable
even with a small number of unused pilots.
Notations: Matrices and vectors are denoted by boldface up-
per and lower case letters, respectively. A∗, AT , AH , and tr(A)
respectively denote conjugate, transpose, conjugate transpose
and trace of a matrix A. IN is the N × N identity matrix. ‖x‖
denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x. Also, 0 and 1 are
respectively the all-zero and all-one column vectors. f (z; s,H)
represents the likelihood function of a random variable z under
hypothesis H and given s.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we present the system model and the jammer’s
strategy to attack the legitimate system in the pilot phase.
A. System Model
Consider the uplink of a single-cell multi-user MIMO system
with one Mr -antenna BS and K legitimate single-antenna users.
There is an Mw-antenna jammer in the network that aims
to reduce the asymptotic spectral efficiency of the legitimate
system. Each channel is modeled as Rayleigh block-fading,
where it is constant within a coherence block of T samples
and has independent realizations between the blocks. Let τ
(τ ≤ T ) be the number of samples during a block spent on
transmission of pilots for channel estimation. We assume that
{φ1, . . . ,φτ} is the set of τ orthonormal pilot sequences, in
which φi ∈ Cτ×1 is the ith pilot and φTi φ∗t =
{
1, t = i
0, t , i
.
We denote by gi(l) ∈ CMr×1, i = 1, . . . ,K and Gw(l) ,
[g(1)w (l) , . . . , g(Mw )w (l)] ∈ CMr×Mw the channels from the ith
legitimate user and the jammer to the BS in the lth block,
respectively, which are defined by gi(l) =
√
βihi(l) and g(j)w (l) =√
βwh
(j)
w (l) , j = 1, . . . ,Mw . The scalars βi , βw are the positive
large-scale fading coefficients and hi(l), h(j)w (l) represent fast
fading in the lth block, which have independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) CN (0, 1) elements. Since the large-scale
fading varies much slower than the fast fading, we assume
that βi , βw remain constant in L coherence blocks which are
distributed over the frequency domain and also over time.
In the pilot phase of the lth block, the users send their
respective pilots φi(l) , i = 1, . . . ,K to the BS. At the same time,
the jammer transmits its jamming signals ψ
(j)
w (l) ∈ Cτ×1, j =
1, . . . ,Mw to create pilot contamination that later will degrade
the asymptotic spectral efficiency of the legitimate system. We
study the single-cell scenario in this letter, which is not too
different from a practical multi-cell scenario, where a pilot reuse
factor of 3, 4, or 7 is used [8, Chapter 6]. Thus, the interference
that comes from pilot reuse in other cells in the pilot phase
is ignored (although, the interference in the data phase might
be large). The received signal at the BS for a given block
l ∈ {1, . . . , L} is modeled as
Y (l) =
K∑
i=1
√
τpgi(l)φTi (l)+
√
τqGw(l)Vw(l)ΨTw(l)+N (l) , (1)
2where p represents the transmit powers of the users and q repre-
sents the transmit power of the jammer per antenna in the pilot
phase. The matrix Vw(l) , [v(1)w (l) , . . . , v(Mw )w (l)]T ∈ CMw×Mw
is the jamming precoder (which is independent of the channels
to the BS) composed of the vectors v
( j)
w (l) ∈ CMw×1, j =
1, . . . ,Mw and Ψw(l) , [ψ(1)w (l) , . . . ,ψ(Mw )w (l)] ∈ Cτ×Mw is the
jamming signal matrix. Furthermore, N (l) ∈ CMr×τ denotes
the normalized receiver noise matrix composed of the elements
distributed as CN (0, 1).
B. Jammer’s Strategy
The jammer aims to maximize its negative impact on the
legitimate system. Since one of the main advantages of us-
ing MaMIMO is achieving high spectral efficiency, a natural
strategy that can be adopted by the jammer is to reduce the
asymptotic spectral efficiency of the legitimate system. To
analyze the worst-case impact of the jamming, we assume that
the jammer is smart and knows the transmission protocol and the
pilot set {φ1, . . . , φτ}. The jammer can obtain this information
by listening to the channel for some consecutive blocks. The
jamming signals ψ
(j)
w (l) in (1) can be generally written as a
combination of the orthonormal pilots as
ψ
(j)
w (l) =
τ∑
i=1
α
(j)
i
(l)φi, (2)
where α
(j)
i
(l) , ψ(j)Tw (l)φ∗i . The power constraint on the
transmitted jamming signals is tr(ΓTw(l) Γ∗w(l)) = Mw , where
Γw(l) , Ψw(l)VTw (l). By defining Mw×1 vectors of coefficients
αi(l) , [α(1)i (l) , . . . , α
(Mw )
i
(l)]T, i = 1, . . . , τ, the jth column of
Γw(l) is derived as
γ
(j)
w (l) =
τ∑
i=1
(
v
( j)T
w (l) αi(l)
)
φi . (3)
Utilizing (3), the power constraint on the transmitted jamming
signals is given by
τ∑
i=1
Mw∑
j=1
v( j)Tw (l) αi(l)2 = Mw (4)
after some algebraic simplifications.
Lemma 1. (Asymptotic spectral efficiency) In a multi-user
MIMO system by utilizing the minimum mean-squared error
estimate in the pilot phase and the maximum ratio combiner in
the data phase as well as for any jamming precoder in the data
phase that is independent of the channels to the BS and follows
the power constraint on the transmitted jamming signals, the
asymptotic spectral efficiency is defined by E
{
C(asy)(l)} where1
C(asy)(l) ≍
(
1 − τ
T
) K∑
i=1
log2
©­­«1 +
p
q
ρ
̺
(
βi
βw
)2
Mw
∑Mw
j=1
v( j)Tw (l) αi(l)2
ª®®¬ .
(5)
The scalar ρ represents the average transmit powers of the users
and ̺ represents the average transmit power of the jammer
per antenna in the data phase. The necessary condition for (5)
is
∑Mw
j=1
|v( j)Tw (l) αi(l) |2 > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, otherwise
C(asy)(l) → ∞.
1We use the notation J1(Mr ) ≍ J2(Mr ) for two arbitrary functions J1 (Mr )
and J2(Mr ), if J1(Mr ) − J2(Mr ) a.s−−−−−−→
Mr→∞
0.
Proof: Lemma 1 is derived analogously to the analysis
presented in [7, Section II], which is omitted here due to limit
of space.
The number of pilots is fixed in practice, while the number
of users vary and is usually below the peak value [9]. Hence,
there are generally τ−K ≥ 1 unused pilots in the network which
can be exploited to improve the security of the network. To this
end, we assume that the BS uses a pseudo-random pilot hopping
technique to assign the pilots randomly to the users [9]. This
technique prevents the jammer from estimating which pilots are
assigned to the users.
Remark 1. (Jammer’s best strategy) In general, the jammer’s
strategy depends on its objective and available information. As
we said before, here the jammer aims to prevent the asymptotic
spectral efficiency in (5) from unlimitedly increasing. If at least
one of
∑Mw
j=1
|v( j)Tw (l) αi(l) |2 = 0, i = 1, . . . ,K, then C(asy)(l) →
∞. This means that the jammer will not successfully limit the
asymptotic spectral efficiency of the MaMIMO systems, if it does
not attack all users. Furthermore, the jammer does not know the
current assigned pilot to each user. Hence, the best strategy that
it can adopt, is to divide its power equally over all pilots, i.e.,
Mw∑
j=1
v( j)Tw (l) α1(l)2 = . . . = Mw∑
j=1
v( j)Tw (l) ατ (l)2 . (6)
From this strategy and the power constraint in (4), we have
Mw∑
j=1
v( j)Tw (l) αi(l)2 = Mw
τ
. (7)
C. Utilization of Unused Pilots
By substituting the definition of the matrix Γw(l) into (1) and
using (3), the received signal at the BS can be rewritten as
Y (l) =
K∑
i=1
©­«
√
τpgi(l) +
Mw∑
j=1
√
τq
(
v
( j)T
w (l) αi(l)
)
g
(j)
w (l)ª®¬φTi
+
τ∑
i=K+1
Mw∑
j=1
√
τq
(
v
( j)T
w (l) αi(l)
)
g
(j)
w (l)φTi + N (l) . (8)
For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, it is
assumed in (8) that the first K pilots of the pilot set are assigned
to the legitimate users and the remaining pilots are unused, i.e.,
φ1(l) = φ1, . . . ,φK (l) = φK . Since the signal received along
each of the unused pilots includes only the jamming signals and
noise, we exploit it to detect the jamming attack. By projecting
Y (l) on each of the unused pilots, we have
yi(l) = Y (l)φ∗i =
Mw∑
j=1
√
τq
(
v
( j)T
w (l) αi(l)
)
g
(j)
w (l) + ni(l) ,
i = K + 1, . . . , τ, (9)
where ni(l) = N (l)φ∗i is the projection of the matrix N (l) on
the ith pilot and ni(l) ∼ CN (0, IM ). In the next section, we
investigate problem of the jamming detection using the observed
signals on the unused pilots in (9).
III. JAMMING DETECTION
In this section, detection of the jamming attack is considered
based on the likelihood functions of the signals observed on
3ln
(
f
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1 ; q˜,H1
))
= −Mr L (τ − K)
2
ln (2π) − Mr L
2
ln (1 + (τ − K) q˜) − 1
2
L∑
l=1
Mr∑
m=1
(
‖ y˜m(l) ‖2 −
q˜| y˜Hm (l) 1|2
1 + (τ − K) q˜
)
(15)
the unused pilots’ directions. The hypothesis test is defined as
follows
H0 : yi(l) = ni(l) ,
H1 : yi(l) =
Mw∑
j=1
√
τq
(
v
( j)T
w (l) αi(l)
)
g
(j)
w (l) + ni(l) . (10)
The hypotheses H0 and H1 respectively denote the absence
and presence of the jammer. The vectors g
(j)
w (l) and ni(l) have
Gaussian distributions. Let Yw(l) , [yK+1(l) , . . . , yτ(l)] be an
Mr × (τ − K) matrix. Under H1, the same terms g(j)w (l) , j =
1, . . . ,Mw are repeated in all columns of Yw(l). Therefore,
there is a correlation between the elements of each row of
the matrix Yw(l). If the mth column of YTw(l) is denoted by
y˜m(l) ∈ C(τ−K)×1, its covariance matrix is calculated as
C (q˜) = E { y˜m(l) y˜Hm (l)} = I(τ−K) + q˜ 11T,
where q˜ , qMwβw . The likelihood function of y˜m(l) is obtained
as
f ( y˜m(l) ; q˜,H1) =
exp
(
− 1
2
y˜Hm (l)C−1 (q˜) y˜m(l)
)
√
(2π)τ−K det (C (q˜))
. (11)
Since the rows of Yw(l) are independent from each other and
also from the elements of Yw(l ′) for l , l ′, we have
f
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1 ; q˜,H1
)
=
L∏
l=1
Mr∏
m=1
exp
(
− 1
2
y˜Hm (l)C−1 (q˜) y˜m(l)
)
√
(2π)τ−K det (C (q˜))
.
(12)
Considering (10), the likelihood function under H0 is obtained
by setting q˜ = 0 in (12). Hence, we have
f
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1 ;H0
)
=
L∏
l=1
Mr∏
m=1
exp
(
− 1
2
‖ y˜m(l) ‖2
)
√
(2π)τ−K
. (13)
Since in (12), q˜ is an unknown parameter, we exploit the GLRT
[10] to decide which hypothesis is true. This enables us to detect
the jamming. The detector derived from the GLRT is given by
L
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1
)
=
f
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1 ; q˜,H1
)
f
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1 ;H0
) H1≷
H0
µ, (14)
where µ is a threshold parameter for detecting the presence
of the jammer. In order to implement the test in (14), the BS
estimates q˜ by utilizing maximum likelihood (ML) estimation
[11] under H1. An equivalent expression for (12) is obtained as
(15), shown at the top of this page. The ML estimation of q˜ is
performed by maximizing the log-likelihood function. Hence, it
is obtained by differentiating (15) with respect to q˜ and solving
the following equation
Mr L (τ − K)
1 + (τ − K) q˜ −
L∑
l=1
Mr∑
m=1
| y˜Hm (l) 1|2
(1 + (τ − K) q˜)2
= 0. (16)
Therefore, the ML estimate of q˜, which is denoted by ˆ˜q, is
ˆ˜q =
∑L
l=1
∑Mr
m=1
| y˜Hm (l) 1|2
Mr L (τ − K)2
− 1
τ − K . (17)
Replacing q˜ in (14) by its ML estimate from (17), the test is
calculated in logarithmic form as
ln
(
L
(
{Yw(l)}Ll=1
))
= −Mr L
2
ln
(
1 + (τ − K) ˆ˜q)
+
ˆ˜q
∑L
l=1
∑Mr
m=1
| y˜Hm (l) 1|2
2
(
1 + (τ − K) ˆ˜q) H1≷H0 ln (µ) .
(18)
Some manipulations of the above inequality lead to
− ln (1 + (τ − K) ˆ˜q) + (τ − K) ˆ˜q H1≷
H0
2
Mr L
ln (µ) . (19)
Since q˜ must be nonnegative, the negative values of ˆ˜q in (17)
are ignored and replaced by ˆ˜q = 0. By defining a monotonically
increasing function J(x) , x − ln (1 + x) for x ≥ 0 and using
(19), we have
J ((τ − K) ˆ˜q) H1≷
H0
2
Mr L
ln (µ) , (20)
or equivalently
ˆ˜q
H1
≷
H0
1
(τ − K) J
−1
(
2
Mr L
ln (µ)
)
= µ′. (21)
Therefore, we can define a positive threshold µ′ and compare
ˆ˜q≷H1H0 µ
′ for detecting the jamming attacks.
A. False Alarm Probability
When the jammer is not present in the network but the BS
detects its presence by mistake, a “false alarm” will occur. The
false alarm probability is defined as PFA , Pr
(
ˆ˜q > µ′;H0
)
.
Theorem 1. In MaMIMO systems, the false alarm probability
of the proposed jamming detector is
PFA = 1 −
γ
(
Mr L,
Mr L(τ−K)µ′+Mr L
2
)
Γ (Mr L) , (22)
where Γ (·) and γ (·, ·) are the gamma and lower incomplete
gamma functions, respectively. The false alarm probability in
(22) asymptotically behaves as
PFA ≍ Q
(√
Mr Lµ
′ (τ − K)
)
, (23)
when Mr → ∞. The notation Q (·) represents the Q-function.
Proof: Under H0, y˜Hm (l) 1 is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with variance τ − K . Therefore, r ,
1
τ−K
∑L
l=1
∑Mr
m=1
| y˜Hm (l) 1|2 is distributed as a chi-square random
variable with 2Mr L degrees of freedom. Hence, we can obtain
the false alarm probability
PFA , Pr
(
ˆ˜q > µ′;H0
)
= Pr (r > Mr L (τ − K) µ′ + Mr L)
= 1 −
γ
(
Mr L,
Mr L(τ−K)µ′+Mr L
2
)
Γ (Mr L) . (24)
The variable r converges in distribution to a Gaussian random
variable as the number of degrees of freedom tends to infinity.
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Fig. 1. Correct detection probability versus the number of BS antennas for
different number of unused pilots and coherence blocks (for PF A = 0.01, and
q = −17 dB).
Therefore, ˆ˜q converges in probability to N
(
0, 1
Mr L(τ−K)2
)
as
Mr → ∞. According to this distribution, we have PFA ≍
Q(√Mr Lµ′(τ − K)).
The false alarm probability is a criterion to choose an
appropriate value for µ′. For the chosen µ′, we obtain the correct
detection probability in next subsection.
B. Correct Detection Probability
If the BS successfully detects the presence of the jammer, a
“correct detection” will occur and its probability is defined as
PC , Pr
(
ˆ˜q > µ′;H1
)
.
Theorem 2. In MaMIMO systems, the correct detection proba-
bility of the proposed jamming detector is
PC = 1 −
γ
(
Mr L,
Mr L(τ−K)µ′+Mr L
2(1+(τ−K)q˜)
)
Γ (Mr L) , (25)
which asymptotically behaves as
PC ≍ 1 −Q
(√
Mr L
(q˜ − µ′) (τ − K)
1 + (τ − K) q˜
)
(26)
when Mr →∞.
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 1, except that under
H1, y˜Hm (l) 1 has the variance (τ − K) (1 + (τ − K) q˜).
Remark 2. Since q˜ ≥ 0 and provided that q˜ > µ′, from (26),
we see that the correct detection probability of the proposed
jamming detector increases by increasing the number of BS
antennas. In particular, PC → 1 and PFA → 0 as Mr →∞.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the behavior of the
proposed detector. It is assumed that Mw = 4, βw = 1, τ =
10 and also the number of independent runs for Monte Carlo
simulations is 105. We select the matrices Vw(l) and Γw(l) so
that the constraint in (7) is satisfied.
Fig. 1 shows how the correct detection probability depends
on the number of antennas, unused pilots, and coherence blocks
that the detection is performed over, simulated under PFA =
0.01 and q = −17 dB.2 The curves are plotted for two different
number of users K ∈ {6, 4} (leading to the number of unused
2Since the noise variance is normalized to one, q can be interpreted as the
SNR.
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Fig. 2. Correct detection probability versus false alarm probability for different
powers at the jammer (for Mr = 100, K = 8, and L = 10).
pilots τ−K ∈ {4, 6}) and two different number of the coherence
blocks L ∈ {1, 10}. It can be seen that by increasing the number
of BS antennas as well as the number of the coherence blocks,
the correct detection probability improves. We see that nearly
perfect detection can be achieved, for example, by utilizing six
unused pilots and Mr = 200 antennas for L = 1. Similarly, for
Mr = 20 and L = 10, the number of required unused pilots for
achieving perfect detection is set to six. However, for Mr = 50
and L = 10, perfect detection is achieved with only four unused
pilots.
In Fig. 2, the correct detection probability of the proposed
detector is depicted versus the false alarm probability for dif-
ferent values of the jammer’s transmission power. It is assumed
Mr = 100, L = 10 and there are two unused pilot sequences
in the network (K = 8). Moreover, when the value of µ′ is
lower than zero, nullifying the negative values of ˆ˜q leads to both
the false alarm and correct detection probabilities become one.
According to (23), µ′ < 0 for PFA > 0.5. Hence, the correct
detection probability is plotted only for PFA ∈ [0, 0.5]. It can
be seen in Fig. 2 that the correct detection probability improves
by increasing the jammer’s transmit power. In addition, all the
curves are above the line PC = PFA, even for low power at
the jammer. Hence, the proposed detector behaves very well in
MaMIMO systems. Furthermore, this simulation confirms our
asymptotic analyses as Mr → ∞ which were presented in the
previous section.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new jamming detector was proposed based
on a GLRT to improve the security of MaMIMO networks. The
proposed detector uses the unused pilots to estimate the received
power of the multi-antenna jammer over multiple coherence
blocks over the frequency domain, and potentially also time
domain. Our analysis shows that the proposed jamming detector
works particularly well in MaMIMO systems and it can be
further enhanced by increasing the number of BS antennas,
unused pilots, and also the coherence blocks that the detection
is performed over. While prior works have proposed methods
to mitigate jamming in MaMIMO, in practice, our detector can
be used as a first step to determine if there exists any jamming
that the legitimate system needs to mitigate.
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